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RECENT DECISIONS
current with the operation. The shield of immunity before and during
operations is nearly complete, leaving possible room for recovery only
where objectively administrative acts are: 1) incidental and 2) not
concurrent with the operation. Thus, a person receiving a blood
transfusion in New York today must be prepared to assume most of
the risk of injury.28
Even if public policy did at one time warrant the doctrine of
immunity for charitable organizations, conditions have changed radi-
cally and the trend reveals a gravitation towards the just imposition
of liability.29 "With today's ready availability of liability insurance
it is difficult to believe that the satisfactory functioning of charitable
institutions requires a gratuitous license to kill or maim." 30 How-
ever, as the law stands in New York today, we are forcing the victim
of a negligent medical act to make an unreasonable contribution 31 to
the tortious charitable organization by a denial of a cause of action.
In addition to the consideration that immunity fosters carelessness, 32
charities should be required to be just before they are generous.33
The aberrational concept of granting immunity even when a charity
"does good in the wrong way," 34 is the creation of the courts. Re-
cently, opportunities have been presented to the New York Court of
Appeals in which it could have eliminated immunity. However, the
Court chose only to reaffirm its prior position.3 5 It then appears that
if we are to find any relief from this inequitable situation, it must
come from the legislature.
TORTS - FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT - GOVERNMENT HELD
LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENT OPERATION OF A LIGHTHOUSE. - Plaintiff
brought an action under Section 1346(b) of the Federal Tort Claims
28 A blood transfusion meets all the requirements of either the lay or legal
definition of an "operation." See WzBsTER's Nmv INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
1707 (2d ed. 1946); BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY 1243 (4th ed. 1951).
29 See Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
This may be illustrated by the fact that both the Federal Government and New
York State have waived their exemption. See Federal Tort Claims Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1952) ; N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8.
30 Thornton & McNiece, Torts, 1955 Survey of N.Y. Law, 31 N.Y.U.L. REV.
344, 363 (1956).
31 See Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P.2d 220, 226 (1951).
32 See Georgetown College v. Hughes, mepra note 29 at 824.
33 See 3 Scorr, TRUSTS § 402, at 2150 (1939).
34 Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
35 See Mrachek v. Sunshine Biscuit, Inc., 308 N.Y. 116, 123 N.E.2d 801
(1954) ; Bakal v. University Heights Sanitarium, Inc., 302 N.Y. 870, 100 N.E.2d
51 (1951) (no opinion), affirming, 277 App. Div. 572, 101 N.Y.S.2d 385 (1st
Dep't 1950).
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Act which provides for governmental liability ". . . under circum-
stances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable
. . . in accordance with the law of the place where the act . . .
occurred." I Plaintiff's tugboat was damaged as a result of the neg-
ligent operation of a lighthouse. It was contended that the operation
of a lighthouse is a uniquely governmental act, and under Louisiana
law there is governmental immunity for analogous activity. The
Supreme Court, in denying defendant's contention, held that once the
Coast Guard personnel undertook to maintain a lighthouse, they were
acting as private persons within the meaning of Section 1346(b), and
as such are liable for their torts irrespective of the fact that no private
persons operate lighthouses. Indian Towing Co. v. United States,
350 U.S. 61 (1955).
In 1946 the Federal Tort Claims Act 2 was passed whereby the
United States waived its immunity from tort liability.3 This waiver
was substantially limited by thirteen exceptions. 4 The most significant
of these is embodied in Section 2680(a) of the act, which excludes
from its provisions any claim which results from an injury caused by
a federal agency in performing its discretionary functions.
The probable intent of Congress in enacting this clause was to
prevent judicial "second-guessing" of high level policy decisions. 5
The courts, however, in construing this section have extended it to
cover situations far removed from such executive determinations. 6
For example, they have held that decisions to uproot a dead tree,7
or as to how much water to let over a dam,8 or whether to spray
herbicide 9 are discretionary within the meaning of the act. Dalehite
v. United States ' 0 is the most recent case illustrative of this tendency.
There the Court held that a decision of a subordinate to bag fertilizer
at 200' F., instead of at a lower figure, involved the exercise of dis-
cretion. It was reasoned that, where there is room for policy judgment
and decision, there is discretion. More germane to the instant case,
however, is the fact that the Court there decided that a Coast Guard
'28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1952) (emphasis added).
2 Ibid.
3 Mr. Justice Holmes in a famous statement explained, "a sovereign is
exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but
on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against
the authority that makes the law on which the right depends." Kawananakoa
v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
4 See 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1952).
5 See Note, 66 HARV. L. REa. 488, 497 (1953).
6 See, e.g., Schmidt v. United States, 198 F.2d 32 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 896 (1952); see Note, 23 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 716 (1955); 22 GEO.
WASH. L. RFv. 496 (1954).
7 Toledo v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 838 (D.P.R. 1951).
8 Olson v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 150 (D.N.D. 1950).
9 Harris v. United States, 106 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. Okla. 1952), aff'd, 205
F.2d 765 (10th Cir. 1953).
10346 U.S. 15 (1953).
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"Fire Fighting Brigade" was absolved from liability in that they were
engaging in an act for which there was no analogous liability in the
law of torts.
In the instant case, the entire Court agreed that failing to check
the light and neglecting to warn vessels that the light was out, fell
outside the realm of the discretionary exception. Neither the ma-
jority nor the dissent gave the rationale behind this conclusion, not-
withstanding the fact that the Court had previously affirmed the Court
of Appeals' decision which placed this case within the scope of the
discretionary clause."
The disagreement in the instant case revolves about the inter-
pretation given the statutory language which makes the government
liable under the law of the state where the act occurred 12 and in the
same manner as a "private individual under like circumstances." 13
The majority interpreted like circumstances to mean similar acts
which, if performed by private individuals, would give rise to
liability.1 4 The dissent contended that since private individuals do not
operate lighthouses there can be no like circumstances. Lighthouse
keeping, they continued, is a "uniquely governmental" activity and
since the law of Louisiana does not provide for governmental liability
in analogous situations, the federal government should not be liable.15
The majority impliedly concluded, however, that while the law of the
state where the acts occurred will determine whether such acts are
tortious, the liability of the federal government is determined by
federal law, and the fact that Louisiana provides for governmental
immunity is immaterial. Although the majority distinguishes the
Dalehite decision, it is submitted that the instant case has overruled
that portion of the opinion which immunizes the Government where
there is no analogous liability for a private individual.1 6
21 In Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 349 U.S. 902 (1955), the Court
by a 4-4 vote affirmed, per curiam, the Court of Appeals' determination in the
instant case (Mr. Justice Harlan not sitting). Subsequently a petition for
rehearing was granted, and the case restored to the docket for reargument
before the full Bench.
12 2 U.S.C. §1346(b) (1952).
1328 U.S.C. §2674 (1952) (emphasis added).
24 For cases where the courts, having once decided that the acts complained
of fell outside the specified exceptions of the Federal Tort Claims Act, looked
to the local law to judge whether the acts are negligent, see McGill v. United
States, 200 F.2d 873 (3d Cir. 1952) (An abandoned Coast Guard tower was
used as a playground by small children. It was held that the Government
should have known of the dangers that caused injuries to one 7 year old.);
Somerset Seafood Co. v. United States, 193 F.2d 631 (4th Cir. 1951) (Govern-
ment held liable for sinking plaintiff's ship because of negligent marking of
wrecked vessel); Hernandez v. United States, 112 F. Supp. 369 (D. Hawaii
1953) (Once the Government set out to build a road, failure to set warning
signals was actionable by those injured.).
Is See Edwards v. Shreveport, 66 So. 2d 373 (La. 1953); cf. Howard v.
New Orleans, 159 La. 443, 105 So. 443 (1925).
16 This apparently was the opinion of Mr. Justice Reed in Indian Towing
Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 76 (1955) (dissenting opinion).
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The Court, by utilizing federal law to establish liability, relieves
federal judges of the task of wading through the quagmire of in-
numerable state approaches to the problem of distinguishing between
what is "governmental" and what is "proprietary." 17 The abandon-
ment of this tenuous distinction serves to broaden federal liability to
a considerable extent, approaching the liberal attitude of the New
York courts.1 8 But perhaps a more important result of this case is
that the Court, without defining discretion, has at last limited its
application, 9 something they refused to do in the Dalehite case.20
That the limitation imposed by the instant case will destroy much of
the importance of the broad definition of the discretionary clause
as propounded in that decision-a construction which has hitherto
thwarted the legislative intent 21-seems to be quite evident. Thus,
after a lapse of ten years marked by judicially superimposed legisla-
tion, the Court has finally agreed to admit that Congress had waived
governmental tort immunity.
X
TORTS - MANUFACTURERS' LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE TO DEFEC-
TIVE PRODUCT - SCOPE OF MacPherson DOCTRINE. - Plaintiff pur-
chased airplanes equipped with latently defective engines. These
17 For examples of the disharmony among the states, see Haley v. Boston,
191 Mass. 291, 77 N.E. 888 (1906). While defendant's employees were col-
lecting ashes from dwelling houses, they ran their cart over the plaintiff's leg.
It was held that the city was not liable since the service performed by the city
was without charge. But the court intimated that the decision would probably
be different if the plaintiff could show that the cart in question had at some time
also carted away steam engine ashes for which the city charged 10 cents a
barrel. See also Williams v. City of New York, 57 N.Y.S.2d 39 (Sup. Ct.
1945); Irvine v. Greenwood, 89 S.C. 511, 72 S.E. 228 (1911); Borchard,
Government Liability In Tort, 34 YALa L.J. 129 (1924).
is See Foley v. New York, 294 N.Y. 275, 62 N.E.2d 69 (1945) (state liable
when negligent failure to replace burned-out bulb in traffic light caused
accident); Bernardine v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604
(1945) (city held liable in negligence action for damages caused by runaway
police horse).
19 This conclusion is borne out by the recent Supreme Court case of United
States v. Union Trust Co., 350 U.S. 907, affirming per curiam sub noant.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
There, the Court affirmed a lower court determination that the discretionary
exemption does not shield the Government from liability for the wrongful death
of airline passengers killed in a plane collision caused by the negligent operation
of a Government control tower. In reaching its decision, the Court relied
solely on the instant case. See also Dahlstrom v. United States, 24 U.S.L.
WE.K 2312 (8th Cir. Jan. 10, 1956).
20 "It is unnecessary to define, apart from this case, precisely where dis-
cretion ends." Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 35 (1953).
21 See Leflar, Torts, 1954 ANN. SURVEY Am. L. 549, 573, 30 N.Y.U.L. Rnv.
645, 669 (1955) ; Notes, 23 Go. WAsH. L. REv. 716, 717 (1955), 66 HARV. L.
REv. 488 (1953).
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